Early termination of coal contracts and compensation in just-transition finance
Development summary
The article examines how coal power purchase agreements and related investment contracts impede the just energy transition. Using Indonesia and Vietnam as case studies, it considers the tension created when Just Energy Transition Partnerships and similar transition-finance tools compensate coal investors, including the risk of claims under investment treaties. The author asks whether full compensation can be squared with the demands of a just transition.
Research note
Issue
Compensation for investors following the early termination of coal power purchase agreements in Indonesia and Vietnam under transition-finance arrangements and international investment treaties.
Why does it matter?
It frames the question of how far compensation for early termination of coal contracts can be justified at the intersection of transition finance and investment law.
Concepts
Academic details
“Phasing Out Coal Investment Contracts: Does Just Transition Finance Legitimize Unjust Compensation?”
ICSID Review - Foreign Investment Law Journal · 2025
DOI 10.1093/icsidreview/siae037